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Abstract This paper studies optimal linear and non-linear income taxes and edu-
cation subsidies in two-type models with endogenous human capital formation, en-
dogenous labor supply, and endogenous wage rates. Assuming constant human cap-
ital elasticities, human capital investment should be efficient under optimal linear
policies, whether general equilibrium effects are present or not. Hence, education
subsidies should not be used for distributional reasons. Due to general equilibrium
effects, optimal linear income taxes may even become negative. Optimal non-linear
policies exploit general equilibrium effects for redistribution. The high-skilled type
optimally has a negative marginal income tax rate and a positive marginal education
subsidy. The low-skilled type optimally faces a positive marginal income tax rate and
a marginal tax on education. Simulations demonstrate that general equilibrium effects
have only a modest effect on optimal non-linear policies.
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“Educational policies deserve to be programmed not only with a view to im-
proving education in the widest sense, but also in order to influence the income
distribution” (Tinbergen 1975, p. 18).
1 Introduction
In his book Income Distribution, the Dutch Nobel-prize winner Tinbergen (1975) ex-
tensively discusses the merits of increasing the supply of skilled workers relative to
unskilled workers to reduce wage inequality. As the relative supply of skilled workers
falls, the skill premium is lowered, and wage inequality diminishes. Tinbergen’s con-
cern with growing inequality between skilled and unskilled workers is more relevant
today than it was in the 1970s. Many Western countries are currently confronted with
sharply increasing skill premiums. Skill-biased technological change causes the de-
mand for skilled workers to increase more rapidly than the supply of skilled workers
(Katz and Autor 1999). In Tinbergen’s terminology: the race between education and
technological change is currently lost by education. Also, globalization may jeopar-
dize the prospects for low-skilled workers. In light of the deteriorating labor market
position of low-skilled workers, it is not surprising that subsidies to foster skill forma-
tion have a strong policy appeal. By boosting human capital formation, equality may
be served because general equilibrium effects on wages reduce the skill premium.
As there is less pre-tax inequality, the need to redistribute incomes through distorting
income taxes may diminish at the same time.
The main question of this paper is: Should general equilibrium effects on the wage
distribution be exploited in an optimal redistributive tax-cum-education system? To
answer this question, this paper analyzes optimal redistributive tax and education
policies in a Mirrlees (1971)-framework. Due to imperfect substitution between dif-
ferent skill types in labor demand, the skill premium is determined by both demand
and supply conditions in the labor market. Furthermore, skill levels are endogenously
determined by human capital investments, and not exogenous as in Mirrlees (1971).
Naturally, governments use the income tax and transfer system to redistribute re-
sources. An important question is, therefore, whether education policies should opti-
mally complement the redistributive tax system. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) derive,
in a partial equilibrium framework, that human capital formation should neither be
taxed nor subsidized (on a net basis) in an optimal redistributive program with linear
or nonlinear taxes and subsidies. The intuition is as follows. One the one hand, sub-
sidies on education are implicit subsidies on work effort, since working and learning
are complementary in generating income. On the other hand, education subsidies are
regressive, since high-ability individuals invest more in human capital (the ‘ability
bias’). With the earnings functions used by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), both ef-
fects cancel out, and the sole role of education subsidies is to offset the distortions of
the income tax on skill formation. Indeed, the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) produc-
tion efficiency theorem dictates that all investments in human capital (an intermediate
input) are efficient under these conditions (Jacobs and Bovenberg 2011).
This paper closely follows the analysis of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). However,
the main difference is that the wages of workers are now endogenous. This paper
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maintains their assumptions to ensure that human capital is optimally not subsidized
in the absence of general equilibrium effects on wages. In particular, the earnings
function is assumed to be weakly separable between ability, labor, and education,
both with linear and nonlinear policies. Additionally, the production function for hu-
man capital is assumed to have a constant elasticity if linear policies are considered,
see also Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011). Individuals also have an iso-elastic utility
function, so that labor supply elasticities are constant, and income effects are ab-
sent. This simple utility function highlights the crucial role of human capital supply
elasticities under linear policy instruments. Finally, the analysis is restricted to two
types of agents that differ in their ability to acquire human capital. We refer to the
high-ability type as the ‘skilled’ and the low-ability type as the ‘unskilled’ agent.1
Whether education policy should optimally be employed to provoke redistributive
general equilibrium effects on the skill premium is shown to depend crucially on two
things. First, can education policy affect the relative supply of human capital in such
a way that the skill premium falls? The skill premium will be a downward sloping
function of the relative supplies of total ‘effective labor supply’. Effective labor sup-
ply is the product of the quantity of labor supply (i.e., hours worked) and the quality
of labor supply (i.e., human capital), which is determined by human capital invest-
ment. Hence, education subsidies must increase the relative effective labor supply to
be helpful in reducing wage inequality. Second, if education subsidies do indeed in-
crease relative supply of effective labor, should education subsidies, when optimally
combined with an income tax, also be used? The answers to both questions are not
obvious, and they differ fundamentally for linear and nonlinear policy instruments.
The first part of this paper considers optimal linear tax and education subsidies.
Linear education subsidies tend to increase effective labor supply of both workers at
the same time, and it is not clear whether relative supply of human capital is increased
at all. The effective labor supply of each agent depends on his human capital and his
labor effort. It is demonstrated that general equilibrium effects can never be exploited
for redistributional reasons when effective labor supply elasticities are equal across
agents, and income effects are absent. The reason is that relative effective labor supply
remains fixed. Indeed, linear education subsidies will only compress wage differen-
tials if the skilled worker’s supply of effective labor is more elastic with respect to the
subsidy than the unskilled worker’s effective labor supply. As agents are assumed to
have human capital production functions with a constant elasticity (under linear in-
struments only), the labor supply elasticity of the skilled worker has to be higher than
that of the unskilled worker for education subsidies to have the potential to compress
the wage distribution.
The second question is: If the skilled worker has a higher labor supply elastic-
ity, and education subsidies therefore can reduce the skill premium, should education
subsidies also be employed in an optimal redistributive program alongside optimal
linear taxes? With linear policies, the answer to this question is no. A linear educa-
tion subsidy is distributionally equivalent to a linear income tax in the absence of
1Strictly speaking, skills are endogenous, and not an innate trait of individuals. Therefore, referring to
the high-(low-)ability type as being ‘skilled’ (‘unskilled’) is slightly abusing language for expositional
reasons.
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general equilibrium effects. The reason is that gross income is linear in education as
a result of the constant elasticity of the production function for human capital. Hence,
it is not optimal to exploit general equilibrium effects with the education subsidy be-
cause the income tax can do this equally well, while avoiding excessive investment in
human capital. By allowing for general equilibrium effects, this paper demonstrates
that the distributional equivalence between income taxes and education taxes is pre-
served. The linear income tax generates the same general equilibrium effects on the
wage distribution as the linear education subsidy, while the latter avoids distortions in
human capital investments. As a result, the efficiency results of Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005) derived in partial equilibrium carry over to the general equilibrium case.
In contrast, the optimal linear income tax is importantly affected by general equi-
librium effects on wages. The assumption that skilled workers have a higher labor
supply elasticity than unskilled workers implies that higher income taxes will reduce
effective labor supply of the skilled workers relatively more than that of unskilled
workers. Linear income taxation thus increases the skill premium, and before-tax in-
come inequality increases. Consequently, general equilibrium effects on wages run
against the distributional benefits of a higher income tax, and optimal income taxes
are lowered as a result. Theoretically, the optimal linear income tax may even turn
negative if the indirect general equilibrium effects on the pre-tax wage distribution
are strong enough to offset the direct effects of higher marginal tax rates on the post-
tax wage distribution. That optimal linear tax rates could be negative is an important
new finding in the literature on optimal linear income taxation (Sheshinski 1972;
Dixit and Sandmo 1977; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980).
The second part of the paper considers the simultaneous setting of optimal non-
linear tax and education policies. Optimal nonlinear policies differ fundamentally
from linear policies when general equilibrium effects on wages are present. The key
to understanding why they differ is that the relative effective labor supply can, by
definition, be directly steered by the nonlinear tax and education schedules—even
if all supply elasticities of labor and human capital are equal. By giving a marginal
education subsidy on the high type, and a marginal education tax on the low type,
the government can directly increase the relative supply of skilled human capital to
lower the skill premium. Therefore, the first question—can education policy affect
the relative supply of education in such a way that the skill premium falls?—can be
answered affirmatively.
The second question is: Should education subsidies be optimally employed in an
optimal redistributive program? The answer with nonlinear policies is yes. The skilled
worker optimally faces a marginal subsidy on education, while the unskilled worker
faces a marginal tax on education. The optimal marginal income tax on the skilled
worker is negative, while the optimal marginal tax on the unskilled worker is positive,
as in Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). Hence, under nonlinear taxation, the efficiency
results break down. We demonstrate that marginal education taxes/subsidies are di-
rectly linked to the top rate: marginal subsidies are zero when the top rate is zero.
As the skilled worker faces a positive subsidy on both labor effort and education, and
the unskilled worker faces a positive tax on both education and labor effort, the skill
premium will be reduced. A skilled worker will be less tempted to mimic an unskilled
worker, incentive compatibility constraints will be relaxed, and the government can
316 B. Jacobs
redistribute more income. In contrast to the linear policies, nonlinear instruments do
exploit general equilibrium effects for redistribution.
We analyze the quantitative importance of general equilibrium effects by simulat-
ing optimal nonlinear income taxes and education subsidies. We find that the marginal
top rate is negative, and rather small for plausible elasticities of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor, which confirms the findings of Stern (1982). Optimal
education subsidies are not large either, since there is a direct link between the top
rate and education subsidies. However, we demonstrate quantitatively that general
equilibrium should be exploited for redistribution when the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor is very low.
Tinbergen’s suggestion to promote skill formation so as to provoke a decline in the
skill premium for redistributional reasons is possible only under nonlinear policies.
The case is lost under linear tax instruments. Intuitively, the generic linear education
subsidy is an inefficient instrument to reduce the skill premium because it increases
human capital supply of all agents simultaneously. Nonlinear education subsidies
avoid this simultaneous increase in human capital supplies and can be tailored to in-
crease supply of the high-ability types, while simultaneously lowering the supply of
the low-ability types. Numerical simulations of optimal nonlinear policies demon-
strate education policies can only be usefully employed for redistribution when the
high-skilled and low-skilled workers are poor substitutes in production. However, for
empirically plausible values of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and un-
skilled workers, it appears that education subsidies have only a limited role to play in
an optimal tax-cum-education policy.2
This paper is related to a number of other papers. First, by allowing for endoge-
nous wage rates, this paper contributes to a growing literature on optimal income
tax and education policies; for earlier contributions, see, for example, Ulph (1977),
Hare and Ulph (1979), Tuomala (1990), and Nielsen and Sørensen (1997). More re-
cent contributions include Maldonado (2008), Alstadsaeter et al. (2008), Grossman
and Poutvaara (2009), and Schindler (2011). Second, a number of papers analyze
optimal taxation if different skill types earn endogenously determined wages, and
the government cannot tax or subsidize all production inputs at different rates. Naito
(1999, 2004, 2007) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) show that both the Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem, and the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
theorem break down with endogenous wages. We also demonstrate that when wages
are endogenous the zero commodity tax theorem is not applicable to education and
production efficiency in human capital formation ceases to be optimal under nonlin-
ear income taxation.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model
with optimal linear income taxation and education policies in general equilibrium.
2From an empirical point of view, evidence is not particularly abundant either. Heckman et al. (1998)
show in a dynamic overlapping generations model of skill formation for the US economy that long-run
income inequality can hardly be changed through education policy. They show that after an initial positive
impact of education subsidies on the relative supply of skilled labor, and thereby a reduction in the skill
premium, the incentives to acquire human capital diminish, and the initial increase in relative supply of
skilled workers is almost completely reversed in the long run.
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Section 3 studies the same problem using nonlinear instruments. Section 4 simu-
lates optimal nonlinear policies. Section 5 concludes. Appendix contains all the main
derivations. Some non-essential derivations and more simulation results are available
in an unpublished appendix.3
2 Model
The standard models of optimal income taxation with general equilibrium effects on
wages are extended with human capital formation.4 This section presents the base-
line model with linear instruments. Nonlinear instruments will be discussed later. In-
dividuals differ in their capacity to accumulate human capital and earnings capacities
of individuals are endogenous rather than exogenously given. Furthermore, individu-
als with higher ability have a comparative advantage in skill formation. A ‘one-shot’
model of human capital investments is analyzed. One may view this model as de-
scribing life-time investments in human capital, life-time labor supply and life-time
consumption, where there are no inter-temporal distortions due to capital taxes or cap-
ital market failures, for example.5 To fully track down the general equilibrium impact
of tax and education policies analytically, the analysis is restricted to two types, as in
almost the entire literature.
2.1 Individuals
There is a unit mass of high-ability and low-ability workers who are indexed by n = 1
and n = 2, respectively. The fraction of high-ability workers is g1 and the fraction of
low-ability workers is g2. Each worker has an iso-elastic utility function u(cn, ln),
which is defined over consumption cn and work effort ln according to
un(cn, ln) ≡ cn − l
1+1/εn
n
1 + 1/εn , n = 1,2, (1)
where εn > 0 is the (un)compensated wage elasticity of labor supply of individual n.
Since income effects are absent, compensated and uncompensated elasticities coin-
cide, and labor supply is always upward sloping. This utility function is also used
for its analytical simplicity in Diamond (1998), Saez (2001), and Naito (2004). This
specification of utility is sufficiently general to stress the main points at stake, while
not introducing additional analytical complexity due to income effects, as in Allen
(1982). Moreover, it highlights the crucial role of different labor supply elasticities
under linear policy instruments. Indeed, elasticities of labor supply are assumed to
differ, and ε1 is not equal to ε2. In the absence of income effects, different elasticities
3This appendix can be downloaded from the author’s website: http://people.few.eur.nl/bjacobs.
4See, for example, Feldstein (1973), Allen (1982), Stern (1982), and Stiglitz (1982).
5The importance of liquidity constraints for human capital formation is increasingly disputed on empirical
grounds by, for example, Cameron and Taber (2004) and Carneiro and Heckman (2004).
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of labor supply or human capital formation are necessary to obtain general equilib-
rium effects of policy. As human capital elasticities are assumed to be equal, see
below, linear policy instruments would have no general equilibrium effects if labor
supply elasticities would be identical.
Gross labor income zn of each individual is
zn ≡ wnhnln, n = 1,2, (2)
where wn denotes the gross wage rate per unit of human capital of an individual
of skill type n, hn is the level of human capital of each agent, i.e., the number of
efficiency units of labor, and ln denotes work effort. Total ‘effective labor supply’
thus equals hnln, which encompasses both the quality of labor and the quantity of
labor supply.
Human capital is accumulated on the intensive margin. Individuals invest en of
their resources in education. One can think of en as the years enrolled in education
or the quality of education where each individual has access to the same educational
inputs, but transforms them differently into human capital depending on ability. The
production function for human capital is given by
hn ≡ anφn(en), φ′(en) > 0, φ′′(en) < 0, n = 1,2, (3)
where an is the exogenous productivity of investment in human capital; a1 > a2, i.e.,
high-ability types have a comparative advantage in learning. High-ability types thus
generate more human capital with the same amount of educational efforts because
∂zn
∂en∂an
= wnφ′(en)ln > 0.6
To ensure that optimal education subsidies are zero in the absence of general equi-
librium effects, the earnings function is weakly separable in ability, education, and
labor. The elasticity of the production function is also assumed to be constant under
linear policies, and is denoted by β ≡ φ′(en)en
φ(en)
(Jacobs and Bovenberg 2011). In gen-
eral equilibrium, the high-ability type is assumed to earn a higher gross wage than the
low-ability type so as to obtain an economically meaningful redistribution problem,
i.e., w1h1l1 > w2h2l2. This assumption guarantees that gross labor earnings for the
high-ability type are always larger than gross labor earnings of the low-ability type.
The price of one unit of education is denoted by p and is common for both individ-
uals.7 All costs are assumed to be tax deductible since the major costs of education
consist of taxed opportunity costs.8 Investments in education en are subsidized at flat
rate s. Gross incomes zn are taxed at a constant marginal rate t . In addition, every
6This form of comparative advantage is sufficiently rich to describe the main results of this paper. We
may, however, allow the two types to accumulate both types of human capital, where the high-ability type is
more productive in skilled human capital accumulation than the low-ability type. This will not qualitatively
affect our main results. Naito (2004) also shows that his results in the more general specification carry over
to the restricted specification.
7Assuming common costs of investment is without loss of generality, since each individual features a
different marginal return on investments in human capital.
8One may, additionally, introduce untaxed direct costs, like tuition fees, but this slightly complicates the
analysis without affecting our main results as long as all costs of education can be verified, and, therefore,
subsidized, see also Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).
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individual may receive a non-individualized lump-sum transfer b. Hence, the income
tax is progressive in the sense that average tax rates increase with income. The funda-
mental informational requirements to levy a linear income tax and to provide linear
education subsidies are that aggregate gross incomes and aggregate investment in
human capital must be verifiable by the government.
Consumption cn equals total net labor income minus education expenditures:
cn = (1 − t)
(
wnanφ(en)ln − (1 − s)pen
) + b, n = 1,2. (4)
The first-order conditions for utility maximization yield the following constant
elasticity labor supply functions for each individual
ln =
(
(1 − t)wnanφ(en)
)εn, n = 1,2. (5)
Labor supply ln increases with the net marginal wage rate and taxes depress labor
supply. The first-order condition for optimal human capital investment is given by
wnanφ
′(en)ln = (1 − s)p, n = 1,2. (6)
Marginal benefits of learning (the left-hand side) should be equal to the marginal costs
of learning (the right-hand side). Subsidies increase investment in human capital.
Taxes have no direct effect on learning because both marginal costs and marginal
benefits are equally affected. Taxation does, however, reduce labor supply and lowers
the returns of investments in human capital indirectly.
First-order conditions are necessary, but not sufficient. Second-order conditions
are satisfied by imposing the following restriction on the parameters:9
μn ≡ 1 − β(1 + εn) > 0, n = 1,2. (7)
The tax elasticities of labor supply εltn ≡ − ∂ln∂t (1−t)ln =
εn(1−β)
μn
, and education εetn ≡
− ∂en
∂t
(1−t)
en
= εn
μn
are important determinants of the optimal tax rates. The tax elasticity
of labor earnings zn = wnanφ(en)ln amounts to εztn = εltn + βεetn = εnμn . Note that the
tax elasticity of total labor earnings zn equals the tax elasticity of effective labor
supply hn, since both wages and ability are exogenous to the individual. The tax
elasticity of gross income εn
μn
exceeds the wage elasticity of gross income εn. The
reason is that the tax rate t reduces the after-tax wage (1− t)wnanφ(en) both directly
(by raising the tax wedge between the before-tax wage and the after-tax wage t) and
indirectly (by depressing the before-tax wage rate wnanφ(en) through its negative
impact on learning en). Learning is harmed indirectly because lower labor supply
depresses the utilization rate of human capital. Similarly, the subsidy elasticities are
given by: εlsn ≡ ∂ln∂s (1−s)ln =
βεn
μn
, εesn ≡ ∂en∂s (1−s)en = 1μn , and εzsn ≡ ∂zn∂s (1−s)zn =
β(1+εn)
μn
.
9The derivations of the second-order conditions and the elasticities are available in a separate appendix,
which can be downloaded from the author’s website: http://people.few.eur.nl/bjacobs.
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2.2 Firms
There is one sector of production. A representative firm maximizes profits while tak-
ing wage rates w1 and w2 for each skill type as given. The firm produces output Y
with a neoclassical production function, which features constant returns to scale in
labor inputs H1 and H2:
Y ≡ F(H1,H2), (8)
where Fn(·) > 0, Fnn(·) < 0, F12 ≥ 0, n = 1,2, and subscript n refers to the nth
argument of differentiation. The income share of the low-income earner is denoted
by α ≡ w2H2
w1H1+w2H2 . 1 − α ≡
w1H1
w1H1+w2H2 is, therefore, the income share of the high-
income earner. Further, if α < 1/2, the low-ability type earns less than the high-ability
type. σ ≡ F1(·)F2(·)
F12(·)F (·) denotes the partial elasticity of substitution between H1 and H2
in the production function F(·).
First-order conditions for profit maximization are necessary and sufficient, and
given by
wn = Fn(H1,H2), n = 1,2. (9)
The skill premium π is the ratio of wages of skilled and unskilled workers, i.e.,
π ≡ w1/w2. With constant returns to scale in production, π is only a function of
the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled workers, H1/H2 (using f (H1/H2) ≡
F(H1,H2)/H2):
π(H1/H2) ≡ w1
w2
= f
′(H1/H2)
f (H1/H2) − (H1/H2)f ′(H1/H2) , (10)
where π ′(H1/H2) < 0. The skill premium decreases if the relative supply of skilled
workers, H1/H2, increases.
Note that if both types have the same labor supply elasticity εn, all the tax and
subsidy elasticities will be equal across individuals (see previous section). Hence,
linear policy instruments cannot affect the skill premium π in that case.
2.3 General equilibrium
Labor market clearing requires that supply equals demand for each labor type:
Hn = hnlngn, n = 1,2. (11)
Further, goods market equilibrium requires that total output equals total consump-
tion, plus investments in human capital, plus exogenously given government expen-
ditures Λ:
F(H1,H2) = (c1 + pe1)g1 + (c2 + pe2)g2 + Λ. (12)
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2.4 Government
The government maximizes a social welfare function over indirect utilities
vn(b, t, s,wn):
ω1v1(b, t, s,w1)g1 + ω2v2v2(b, t, s,w2)g2, ωn ≥ 0, n = 1,2, (13)
where ωn denotes the Pareto weight of type n in social welfare. The Pareto weights
sum to one: ω1 + ω2 = 1. If ω1 = ω2 = 12 , the social welfare function is utilitarian,
and there is no social preference for redistribution due to the constancy of marginal
utility of income at the individual level (no income effects). ω2 > ω1 implies a social
preference for redistribution.10
The government collects taxes to finance the lump-sum transfer, the education sub-
sidies, and the exogenous revenue requirement Λ. The government budget constraint
reads as:
t
(
w1a1φ(e1)l1 − (1 − s)pe1
)
g1 + t
(
w2a2φ(e2)l2 − (1 − s)pe2
)
g2
= spe1g1 + spe2g2 + b + Λ. (14)
3 Optimal linear taxes and education subsidies
The government maximizes social welfare by optimally choosing the lump-sum
transfer b, the linear marginal tax t and the linear education subsidy s. Formally,
the following Lagrangian is maximized:11
max{b,t,s} L = ω1v1(b, t, s,w1)g1 + ω2v2(b, t, s,w2)g2
+ η(t(w1a1φ(e1)l1 − (1 − s)pe1
)
g1 + t
(
w2a2φ(e2)l2 − (1 − s)pe2
)
g2
)
− η(spe1g1 + spe2g2 + b + Λ), (15)
where η denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint, and the
labor market clearing conditions have to be imposed, i.e., wn = Fn(H1,H2), where
Hn = hnlngn, n = 1,2.
The first-order condition for the optimal lump-sum transfer is
ω1
η
g1 + ω2
η
g2 = 1, (16)
where we used Roy’s lemma ( ∂vn
∂b
= 1), and ωn
η
is the social marginal utility of income
of type n. The average social marginal benefits of a higher b (i.e., the left-hand side
of (16)) should equal the costs in terms of a higher b (i.e., the right-hand side of (16)).
10Without loss of generality, social welfare weights are kept constant, but these may be derived from a
concave function over private utilities.
11Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that there is no guarantee that the second-order conditions for the
government’s maximization problem are automatically satisfied. We assume, however, that the first-order
conditions are indeed sufficient to characterize the optimal solution.
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With the aid of the first-order condition for b (16), the distributional characteristic
ξz of labor income is defined as (minus) the normalized covariance between the so-
cial marginal utility of income ωn
η
, and gross labor income zn (Atkinson and Stiglitz
1980):
ξz ≡ −
∑
n
ωn
η
zngn − ∑n zngn
∑
n
ωn
η
gn
∑
n zngn
∑
n
ωn
η
gn
=
∑
n(1 − ωnη )zngn∑
n zngn
, (17)
where the second equality follows from (16). With a positive distributional charac-
teristic ξz, taxing labor income yields distributional benefits because the high-ability
worker has a lower welfare weight than the low-ability worker, i.e., ω1
η
< ω2
η
, and
earns a higher income, z1 > z2. Indeed, a zero distributional characteristic implies ei-
ther that the government is utilitarian (ω2 = ω1), and not interested in redistribution,
or that the marginal contribution to the tax base is equal for both ability types (i.e.,
taxable income zn is the same for both types).
Similarly, the distributional characteristic of education ξe is defined as
ξe ≡ −
∑
n
ωn
η
engn − ∑n engn
∑
n
ωn
η
gn
∑
n
ωn
η
gn
∑
n engn
=
∑
n(1 − ωnη )engn∑
n engn
= ξz. (18)
A positive distributional characteristic implies that subsidizing (taxing) education re-
sults in distributional losses (gains). If education levels are equal for both workers,
there is no educational inequality, and subsidizing education yields no distributional
losses. The absence of a redistributional motive renders the distributional character-
istic zero.
Note that the distributional characteristic of education is equal to the distributional
characteristic of income because gross earnings are linear in education due to the
constant elasticity of the production function for human capital. This assumption
ensures that (negative) education subsidies are distributionally equivalent to income
taxes, see also Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011). In the remainder, the superscripts are
dropped, and ξ ≡ ξz = ξe.
Simplifying the first-order condition for t yields the optimal linear income tax at
optimal education policy (see Appendix)
t
1 − t =
1
ε¯zt
(
ξ −
(
ω2
η
− ω1
η
)(
ε1
μ1
− ε2
μ2
)
α(1 − α)
(1 − β)
1
σ
)
, (19)
where ε¯zt = ((1 − α)εlt1 + αεlt2 )/(1 − β) is the income weighted average of the tax
elasticity of total labor earnings (i.e., effective labor supply). This expression gen-
eralizes the standard expression for the optimal linear income tax by allowing for
human capital formation and general equilibrium effects on wages (Sheshinski 1972;
Dixit and Sandmo 1977; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980).
The optimal income tax formula shows the trade-off between equity (numerator)
and efficiency (denominator). The larger the social preference for redistribution, the
larger the ξ , and the higher the optimal marginal income tax. If both groups have an
equal weight in social welfare (ω2 = ω1), the optimal marginal income tax is zero
because ξ = 0 and ω2
η
= ω1
η
. The larger the income-weighted average elasticity of
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labor earnings, the lower the optimal linear income tax because the labor-income tax
more heavily distorts labor supply. Both the elasticities of labor supply and human
capital formation determine the effective elasticity of earnings, which is due to the
feedback between labor supply and human capital formation; see also Bovenberg and
Jacobs (2005) for a more elaborate discussion.
The expression for the optimal income tax in general equilibrium differs from its
partial-equilibrium counter part due to the presence of (ω2
η
− ω1
η
)( ε1
μ1
− ε2
μ2
)
α(1−α)
(1−β)
1
σ(Bovenberg and Jacobs 2005). This term measures the distributional losses (or gains)
arising from general equilibrium effects on wages, and are subtracted from the direct
welfare gains of higher income taxes in reducing inequality (as measured by ξ ). The
optimal marginal linear income tax is lower with general equilibrium effects than
without if: (i) substitution between labor types is finite (σ < ∞), (ii) the (uncompen-
sated) earnings elasticity of the skilled worker is larger than that of the unskilled type
(εzt1 = ε2μ2 > εzt2 = ε2μ2 ).
The effects of imperfect substitution in labor types have been subject of most of
the papers in this field, so these results do not come as a surprise. If labor types are
perfect substitutes (σ = ∞), the last term in the expression of the optimal income tax
(19) vanishes. In this case, wage rates per hour worked are not affected by changes in
relative factor supplies, and the wage distribution is exogenous.
The second condition on the relative sizes of labor supply elasticities has received
no attention so far. The formula demonstrates that general equilibrium effects only
contribute to more equality if high-skilled labor earnings respond less elastically to
an increase in taxes than low-skilled labor earnings (εzt1 = ε1μ1 < εzt2 =
ε2
μ2
). In that
case, higher taxes raise relative supply of skilled labor (H1/H2), the skill premium
π(H1/H2) declines, see (10), and smaller before-tax wage inequality results. If, how-
ever, skilled labor supply responds more elastically to taxes than unskilled labor sup-
ply (εzt1 = ε1μ1 > εzt2 = ε2μ2 ), general equilibrium effects work against redistribution
of incomes through income taxes by increasing before-tax income inequality as the
relative supply of skilled labor declines.
If the compensated elasticities of effective total labor supply εzt1 and ε
zt
2 are identi-
cal (εzt1 = εzt2 so that ε1μ1 = ε2μ2 and ε1 = ε2), the general equilibrium term vanishes as
well. The intuition is straightforward. With equal elasticities, linear taxation does not
affect relative labor supply. If relative effective labor supply (H1/H2) remains con-
stant, relative wages (w1/w2) remain constant as well, cf. the skill premium (10). This
is the case, for example, if all individuals have identical preferences (ε1 = ε2). Hence,
this example illustrates the necessity of heterogeneous preferences (in the absence of
income effects) for our model to make sense in a general equilibrium context.12
A higher elasticity of skilled labor supply (ε1 > ε2) is a necessary requirement
for education subsidies to work in favor of redistribution via general equilibrium
effects under linear policy instruments. Intuitively, only if the high-skilled agent
12Using identical utility functions, Allen (1982) found that general equilibrium effects may result in both
lower and higher optimal linear income tax rates compared to the case with exogenous wages. Higher
optimal linear taxes can be found if income effects in labor supply are sufficiently strong. Even when
skilled and unskilled workers have identical preferences, income effects can drive the uncompensated
wage elasticity of labor supply of skilled workers below the uncompensated labor supply elasticity of
unskilled workers, and general equilibrium effects work in favor of redistribution.
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has a higher elasticity of human capital investments with respect to subsidies (i.e.,
εes1 = 11−β(1+ε1) > 11−β(1+ε2) = εes2 ), subsidies on human capital can compress the
wage distribution by boosting high-skilled human capital more than low-skilled hu-
man capital. Hence, we will assume that ε1 > ε2. Also from an empirical point of
view, a larger elasticity of skilled labor earnings relative to unskilled labor earnings
is plausible (Gruber and Saez 2003).
The expression for the optimal income tax (19) suggests that optimal marginal
income taxes may even become negative if general equilibrium effects are strong
enough and elasticities of effective total labor supply are sufficiently diverging. In
that case, subsidizing work effort provokes such strong general equilibrium effects
that low-ability workers are better off by paying subsidies to the high-ability workers;
their before tax wages increase more than is needed to offset the rise in lump-sum
taxes to finance the subsidies on work. Jacobs (2007) shows that this can happen
even under not very unrealistic values for the elasticities of the model.
The general solution for optimal education subsidies in the presence of general
equilibrium effects at the optimal tax system is (see Appendix)
s = 0. (20)
The government sets the subsidies on education to zero. Therefore, educational in-
vestments are efficient in the presence of an optimal income tax. The intuition is
similar as in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011).
Education subsidies do not reduce the labor supply distortion more compared to
an equally costly reduction in income taxes. Intuitively, the constant elasticity in the
human capital production function ensures that there is a linear relation between en
and zn. Hence, subsidizing en is equivalent to subsidizing zn. However, besides dis-
torting labor supply, subsidies on education also distort human capital investment.
This distortion in education (over-investment) can be avoided by not subsidizing edu-
cation. Therefore, the government does not want to use education subsidies to reduce
the tax wedge on labor supply.
The government is also indifferent between education taxes and income taxes to
redistribute income. Again, because education is linear in income, any redistribution
that education taxes can achieve, can also be achieved with income taxes. Indeed, the
distributional characteristics of income (ξz) and education (ξe) are equal. While both
taxes on income and education reduce labor effort, taxing education en additionally
causes under-investment in human capital. The income tax does not directly distort
human capital investment because costs and benefits of education are equally affected
by the marginal tax rate. The government can therefore avoid distortions in human
capital accumulation by taxing income instead of taxing education to redistribute
resources.
In contrast to Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), both subsidies and income taxes do
cause general equilibrium effects. Nevertheless, their combined effect cancels in the
expression for optimal education subsidies, since general equilibrium effects do not
upset the linear relationship between earnings and education. Intuitively, (lower) in-
come taxes can, in principle, achieve the same wage compression as (higher) edu-
cation subsidies without causing inefficiencies in human capital formation. Hence,
education subsidies remain distributionally equivalent to income taxes even in the
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presence of general equilibrium effects. For the same reasons, education subsidies
still cannot be used as implicit taxes on leisure. Optimal subsidies thus ensure effi-
ciency in human capital formation. Thus, from this discussion follows that education
subsidies should not be employed to compress the wage distribution in the optimal
redistributive program.
Due to the specific form of the earnings function and the linearity of policy in-
struments, the government can effectively separate production decisions from con-
sumption choices, also in general equilibrium. By ensuring that all costs of education
are effectively tax deductible, the government has access to a perfect profit tax to tax
the rents from ability in human capital formation. Hence, the Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) production efficiency theorem still applies as in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).
The results in this section depend on specific assumptions regarding the utility
function and the production function for human capital. Allowing for income effects
(Allen 1982) and non-constant elasticities in the human capital production function
will generally result in a role for general equilibrium effects determining optimal
education policies. However, non-constant elasticities would give a role for educa-
tion policies even in the absence of general equilibrium effects (Maldonado 2008;
Jacobs and Bovenberg 2011). Moreover, income effects in labor supply would gen-
erate an additional channel (through the feedback of labor supply with human capital
formation) whereby general equilibrium effects affect optimal education policies. We
have switched off this (second-order) feedback by assuming that the income effects
in labor supply are identical among individuals (i.e., both have a zero income effect).
As long as income elasticities in labor supply are identical, not necessarily zero, the
results of the current section remain valid. Hence, our findings are a reasonable first-
order approximation, given that there is no compelling evidence indicating that in-
come elasticities in labor supply and human capital elasticities differ much among
skill types.
4 Optimal nonlinear taxes and subsidies
This section derives the optimal nonlinear tax and education policies. We maintain
the assumption that the earnings function is weakly separable in ability, labor, and ed-
ucation, but we can now allow for general utility and production functions for human
capital. These conditions still ensure that optimal education subsidies are zero in the
absence of general equilibrium effects on wages (Jacobs and Bovenberg 2011). All
results presented in this section are qualitatively the same with the specifications for
the utility and the human capital production functions that we used to study the linear
tax case. We also provide simulations of the optimal nonlinear taxes and subsidies,
while maintaining the same structure on preferences and technologies as in the linear
case.
The optimal nonlinear tax and subsidy rates are found by deriving the optimal
second-best allocation of consumption, gross income and education, as in Stern
(1982) and Stiglitz (1982). By using the first-order conditions for individual opti-
mization, we can compute the optimal marginal income taxes and optimal marginal
education subsidies that would decentralize the optimal second-best allocation.
326 B. Jacobs
Any solution to the optimal second-best problem has to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints stating that each individual n has a weakly higher util-
ity choosing the bundle (cn, zn, en) of consumption, gross income and education,
which is intended for them, than utility of choosing the alternative bundle of
(cm, zm, em), which is intended for the other individual m (n,m = 1,2, n = m). That
is,
u1(c1, l1) = u1
(
c1,
z1
w1a1φ(e1)
)
≥ u1
(
c2,
z2
w1a1φ(e2)
)
= u1
(
c2,
w2a2
w1a1
l2
)
, (21)
u2(c2, l2) = u2
(
c2,
z2
w2a2φ(e2)
)
≥ u2
(
c1,
z1
w2a2φ(e1)
)
= u2
(
c1,
w1a1
w2a2
l1
)
. (22)
The government maximizes the social welfare function (13) subject to the econ-
omy’s resource constraint (12), and incentive compatibility constraint (21). Under
normal circumstances, the second incentive constraint (22) is not binding at an op-
timal solution, and it will be ignored in the remainder (Stern 1982; Stiglitz 1982).
Assuming for simplicity that the price of a unit of education is one, and the number of
high-ability and low-ability persons are both equal to one, the following Lagrangian
for the maximization of social welfare is formulated13
max{c1,l1,e1,c2,l2,e2}
L = ω1u1(c1, l1) + ω2u2(c2, l2)
+ η(F (a1φ(e1)l1, a2φ(e2)l2
) − e1 − e2 − c1 − c2 − Λ
)
+ θ
(
u1(c1, l1) − u∗1
(
c2,π
−1
(
a1φ(e1)l1
a2φ(e2)l2
)
a2
a1
l2
))
, (23)
where the inverse of the skill premium is denoted by π−1, see (10). The conditions
for labor market equilibrium (11) are substituted. To avoid confusion in notation,
utility of the high-skilled type mimicking the low-skilled type is designated by u∗1 ≡
u1(c2,
w2a2
w1a1
l2). θ is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint.
First-order conditions for an optimal allocation are
∂L
∂c1
= ω1 ∂u1
∂c1
− η + θ ∂u1
∂c1
= 0, (24)
∂L
∂l1
= ω1 ∂u1
∂l1
+ ηa1φ(e1)F1(·) + θ ∂u1
∂l1
− θ ∂u
∗
1
∂l2
l2
a2
a1
∂π−1(·)
∂l1
= 0, (25)
∂L
∂e1
= η(a1φ′(e1)l1F1(·) − 1
) − θ ∂u
∗
1
∂l2
l2
a2
a1
∂π−1(·)
∂e1
= 0, (26)
∂L
∂c2
= ω2 ∂u2
∂c2
− η − θ ∂u
∗
1
∂c2
= 0, (27)
13Extensions with p differing from one and different fractions gn of both types are straightforward and do
not provide additional insights.
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∂L
∂l2
= ω2 ∂u2
∂l2
+ ηa2φ(e2)F2(·) − θ ∂u
∗
1
∂l2
a2
a1
(
π−1(·) − l2 ∂π
−1(·)
∂l2
)
= 0, (28)
∂L
∂e2
= η(a2φ′(e2)l2F2(·) − 1
) − θ ∂u
∗
1
∂l2
l2
a2
a1
∂π−1(·)
∂e2
= 0. (29)
From the first-order conditions for c1 (24) and l1 (25) follows the marginal tax
rate, T ′1 ≡ 1 + 1w1a1φ(e1)
∂u1/∂l1
∂u1/∂c1
, on the high-ability type (see Appendix):14
T ′1 =
θ
η
1
σ
α
(1 − α)
1
w1a1φ(e2)
∂u∗1
∂l2
< 0. (30)
Consequently, the marginal top rate is exploited for redistribution with general equi-
librium effects on wages. Indeed, the general expression of the optimal marginal tax
on the skilled type is almost identical to the one without human capital formation
(Stern 1982; Stiglitz 1982). The basic intuition of these papers carries over to the
present case. A marginal subsidy on work for the high-ability type increases relative
supply of skilled human capital, and lowers the skill premium π . Hence, the utility
costs of mimicking the low-ability type increase, as it takes the skilled type more la-
bor time to mimic the unskilled type. In the absence of general equilibrium effects on
wages (σ = ∞), there is no distortion at the top, and the marginal tax rate is zero; see
also Seade (1977). Further, if the government is not interested in redistribution, the
incentive constraint is slack, θ is zero, and optimal marginal taxes are zero as well.
Manipulation of the first-order condition for c2 (27) and the first-order con-
dition for l2 (28) yields the marginal tax on labor of the low-ability type T ′2 ≡
1 + 1
w2a2φ(e2)
∂u2/∂l2
∂u2/∂c2
(see Appendix):
T ′2
1 − T ′2
= θ
η
∂u∗1
∂c2
+ T
′
1
(1 − T ′2)
(1 − α)
α
(σ − 1). (31)
In the absence of general equilibrium effects, the marginal tax rate on the low-ability
type is unambiguously positive, since the top rate is zero (T ′1 = 0) in that case (Mir-
rlees 1971; Stiglitz 1982). The presence of general equilibrium effects (lower σ ) in-
creases the marginal tax rate T ′2 on the low type (recall T ′1 < 0). This is intuitive,
since a higher marginal tax rate on the low type reduces their labor supply, and there-
fore results in more before-tax wage equality. Hence, the high type is less tempted to
mimic the low type, which relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint, and there-
fore results in more redistribution.
The optimal marginal education subsidy rate for the high type is derived from
combining the first-order conditions for e1 (26) with the optimal marginal income tax
for skilled workers (30). Then, we find that the optimal marginal education subsidy
for high-ability workers S′1 ≡ 1 − w1a1φ′(e1)l1 is positive (see Appendix):
S′1
1 − S′1
= −θ
η
1
σ
α
(1 − α)
1
w1a1φ(e2)
∂u∗1
∂l2
= −T ′1 > 0. (32)
14With only two types, the tax schedule is not continuous and generally not differentiable. As such, one
cannot equate 1 + 1
a1φ(e1)F1
∂u1/∂l1
∂u1/∂c1
with the derivative of a tax schedule T (z1) at income point z1.
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The intuition is that a marginal subsidy on human capital investment of the high type
(like the marginal subsidy on work) lowers the skill premium, and makes it more
costly for the high-ability type to mimic the low-ability type.
Similarly, we find the optimal marginal subsidy rate on education for the low-
ability type S′2 ≡ 1 − w2a2φ′(e2)l2 from the first-order condition for e2 (29) and the
tax rate (31) (see Appendix):
S′2
1 − S′2
= θ
η
1
σ
α
(1 − α)
1
w2a1φ(e2)
∂u∗1
∂l2
= (1 − α)
α
T ′1 < 0. (33)
Therefore, education is taxed on the margin for the low-ability type. Again, the mech-
anism is that general equilibrium effects relax the incentive compatibility constraint,
and the government can redistribute more income.
Note that the expressions for the marginal education subsidies are all directly re-
lated to the top rate. Indeed, subsidies or taxes on education are larger if the top rate
is lower, i.e., when general equilibrium effects are more important (lower σ ), and if
the government wishes to redistribute incomes more heavily (larger θ ). If labor types
are perfect substitutes (σ = ∞), the optimal marginal education subsidies for both
high and low-skilled workers are zero, i.e., S′1 = S′2 = 0, cf. Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005).
General equilibrium effects on the skill premium should indeed be exploited for
redistribution under nonlinear policies, in contrast to optimal linear policies. The in-
tuition is that, by using nonlinear instruments, the government can directly influence
the skill premium π(H1/H2) by setting different marginal tax and subsidy rates for
each worker, as long as the policy remains incentive compatible. This holds true ir-
respective of preferences or technologies. Hence, by optimally employing marginal
subsidies on the high-ability type and marginal taxes on the low-ability type, the
skill premium falls, the incentive compatibility constraint is relaxed, and the policy
achieves more income redistribution.
Indirect taxes/subsidies, such as education subsidies, are not optimally zero under
nonlinear income taxation with weakly separable preferences. This bolsters the find-
ings by Naito (1999, 2004, 2007) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) who investigated
the desirability of nonzero commodity taxes and deviations from production effi-
ciency in general equilibrium settings with endogenous wages. In the current model,
education should optimally be taxed or subsidized under nonlinear income taxation
to exploit factor price changes for redistribution, and the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
theorem does not apply to education subsidies. Moreover, since education choices are
generally not efficient, the Diamond–Mirrlees production efficiency theorem ceases
to apply to individual human capital production as well. The intuition is that, due
to the nonlinearity of the policy schedules, the optimal policies do not constitute a
perfect profit tax on the rents from human capital formation. As a result, consump-
tion and investment choices cannot be (weakly) separated, which is a prerequisite
for the production efficiency theorem to apply. In the absence of general equilibrium
effects, education would not be taxed or subsidized on a net basis, and would be
efficient.
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5 Simulations of optimal nonlinear policies
To check whether general equilibrium effects can be quantitatively important for op-
timal nonlinear tax and education policies, we simulate the model following Stern
(1982). We resort to the standard iso-elastic utility function with a constant wage
elasticity of labor supply, which is augmented with a preference parameter δ to cali-
brate the dis-utility of labor supply:
un(cn, ln) ≡ cn − δ
(
l
1+1/εn
n
1 + 1/εn
)
, n = 1,2. (34)
In the baseline, we set the wage elasticities of labor supply equal for both types
at ε1 = ε2 = 0.2, cf. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). The preference parameter for
leisure is calibrated at δ = 10, so as to keep labor effort of both types between 0
and 1. The production function for human capital is Cobb–Douglas, anφ(en) ≡ aneβn ,
with an elasticity β = 0.2. This is probably a lower bound.15 The ability parameters
are set at a1 = 10 and a2 = 8. The aggregate production function features a constant
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor:
Y = (γHρ1 + (1 − γ )Hρ2
)1/ρ
, σ ≡ 1
1 − ρ . (35)
The elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled labor is set at σ = 1.5.
The survey provided in Katz and Autor (1999) suggests values for σ between 1 and
2.5.16
The share parameter is calibrated in the baseline at γ = 0.63 to get an income
share of skilled labor in total output of 1 − α = 0.65 in the absence of government
intervention Stern (1982). The baseline welfare weights in the social welfare function
are ω1 = 1 − ω2 = 0.25. Setting ω1 = ω2 = 0.5 corresponds to a utilitarian criterion,
which is non-redistributive because the private marginal utility of income is unity.
ω1 = 1 − ω2 = 0 corresponds to a Rawlsian social welfare function. At the baseline
simulation, the government revenue requirement is set at zero: Λ = 0. The simulation
results are given in Table 1.
Calculations by Stern (1982) in models without endogenous human capital for-
mation reveal that general equilibrium effects have little impact on simulated opti-
mum tax rates. We largely confirm this in all simulations. The top rate is indeed only
15Standard Mincer wage equations regress the logarithm of gross earnings on years of education and
commonly find an estimate of 5–10 % (Card 1999). By log-differentiating gross earnings z with respect to
e, we can interpret β/e as a measure for the Mincer return. For example, if high-skilled individuals have 4
years more education (e = 4), and the Mincer return is 7.5 %, then β = 0.3.
16More recent empirical evidence confirms these estimates. For example, Goldin and Katz (2007) esti-
mate a value of σ = 1.64. Ciccone and Peri (2005) estimate σ = 1.5. Blankenau and Cassou (2011) find
similar estimates using aggregate data and even (much) higher elasticities using sectoral data. In a separate
appendix, all simulations are presented as well for σ = 0.5 and σ = 2.5, since the elasticity of substitu-
tion is the key elasticity determining general equilibrium effects on the wage structure. The appendix can
be downloaded from the author’s website: http://people.few.eur.nl/bjacobs. The conclusion that general
equilibrium effects have only a limited impact on optimal policies is robust to these variations in σ .
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Table 1 Optimal non-linear tax and education policies
σ ∞ 5 2.5 2 1.5 0.99 0.5
γ 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.6 0.63 0.67 0.8
T ′1 0.0 % −0.3 % −0.8 % −1.0 % −1.1 % −1.9 % −2.7 %
T ′2 31.0 % 31.6 % 31.8 % 32.0 % 32.6 % 33.4 % 35.3 %
S′1 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.7 % 1.0 % 1.1 % 1.9 % 2.6 %
S′2 0.0 % −0.7 % −1.5 % −2.0 % −2.3 % −4.0 % −6.2 %
ε1 0.75 0.5 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15
T ′1 −13.2 % −8.0 % −4.5 % −3.2 % −2.1 % −1.1 % −0.4 %
T ′2 24.8 % 28.0 % 30.3 % 31.1 % 31.9 % 32.6 % 33.1 %
S′1 11.6 % 7.4 % 4.3 % 3.1 % 2.1 % 1.1 % 0.4 %
S′2 −34.6 % −19.0 % −9.9 % −7.0 % −4.5 % −2.3 % −0.8 %
ε2 0.75 0.5 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15
T ′1 −0.4 % −0.6 % −0.8 % −0.9 % −1.0 % −1.1 % −1.3 %
T ′2 33.0 % 32.9 % 32.8 % 32.7 % 32.6 % 32.6 % 32.5 %
S′1 0.4 % 0.6 % 0.8 % 0.9 % 1.0 % 1.1 % 1.2 %
S′2 −1.0 % −1.4 % −1.8 % −1.9 % −2.1 % −2.3 % −2.6 %
β 0.4 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1
T ′1 −2.4 % −1.6 % −1.3 % −1.1 % −1.0 % −0.8 %
T ′2 31.6 % 32.2 % 32.4 % 32.6 % 32.7 % 32.8 %
S′1 2.4 % 1.6 % 1.3 % 1.1 % 0.9 % 0.8 %
S′2 −5.6 % −3.5 % −2.8 % −2.3 % −2.0 % −1.7 %
ω1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
T ′1 0.0 % −0.5 % −0.9 % −1.3 % −1.7 % −2.1 %
T ′2 0.0 % 16.3 % 27.9 % 36.7 % 43.5 % 48.9 %
S′1 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.9 % 1.3 % 1.7 % 2.1 %
S′2 0.0 % −1.0 % −1.9 % −2.8 % −3.7 % −4.6 %
slightly negative, even with endogenous learning. Since the expressions for optimal
education subsidies are all directly related to the top rate, we see that the general
equilibrium impact on optimum nonlinear subsidies is rather limited as well.
As expected, the optimal tax expressions are most sensitive to changes in the elas-
ticity of substitution σ . In the top rows of Table 1, we calibrate the parameter γ so
as to keep the income share of skilled labor fixed at 1 − α = 0.65 in the absence of
government intervention.17 We find that marginal education subsidies and taxes are
substantially differing from zero when the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labor falls below unity, which is empirically less plausible.
17Otherwise, the condition that the skilled wage is always higher than the unskilled wage may be violated,
and the redistribution problem will become misspecified.
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Further, the elasticity of high-ability labor supply ε1 is important in explaining the
pattern of marginal taxes and subsidies. It is a crucial determinant of the incentive
compatibility constraint. The higher this elasticity, the easier it is for the high type
to mimic the low type, and the larger are marginal subsidies on high-ability labor
supply and education. From the table follows that the main results are not driven by
the labor supply elasticity of the low type, nor by the human capital elasticity, or the
social welfare function.18
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the simultaneous setting of optimal linear and nonlinear income
taxes and education subsidies in two-type models with endogenous labor supply, en-
dogenous human capital formation, and endogenous wage rates. To investigate the
potential role of general equilibrium effects in shaping optimal linear tax and educa-
tion policies, we ensured that optimal subsidies on education are zero in the absence
of general equilibrium effects on wages. This required weakly separable earnings
functions, and, for linear instruments only, a constant elasticity in the human capital
production function. For linear education subsidies to work in favor of redistribu-
tion, we further assumed that labor supply of the high-ability (‘skilled’) type is more
elastic than labor supply of the low-ability (‘unskilled’) type. Linear taxes and sub-
sidies cannot—by assumption—affect the skill premium if all behavioral elasticities
are equal.
We showed that optimal linear education subsidies are zero, even if linear tax
and education policies have the potential to provoke equilibrium effects on wage
rates. The intuition is that linear income taxes are distributionally equivalent to (neg-
ative) linear education subsidies, and more efficient because income taxes do not
generate distortions in human capital formation, whereas linear subsidies cause over-
investment. This holds true whether general equilibrium effects are present or not.
The optimal linear income tax is, however, lowered due to general equilibrium effects
on wages if skilled labor supply is more elastic than unskilled labor supply. A higher
income tax increases the skill premium because skilled labor supply falls more than
unskilled labor supply. These general equilibrium effects work against the direct re-
distributional gains of a higher income tax rate. The optimal linear income tax rate
may even turn negative when general equilibrium effects on wages are sufficiently
strong.
The results for optimal nonlinear policies are found to be fundamentally different.
With nonlinear instruments, the government can directly affect the relative supply
of skilled human capital using specific instruments, such as marginal subsidies on
human capital or labor supply of the high type, and marginal taxes on human capi-
tal or labor supply of the low type. Consequently, one does not need to impose re-
strictions on preferences or the production function for human capital to obtain an
18Due to the absence of income effects, all reported results are completely insensitive to changing the
government revenue requirement.
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impact of nonlinear policies on the skill premium. The nonlinearity of tax and sub-
sidy schedules is sufficient. Optimal nonlinear policies do exploit general equilibrium
effects on wages for redistributional purposes. The skilled worker optimally faces
marginal subsidies on both work effort and education, whereas the unskilled worker
optimally faces marginal taxes on work and education. As a result, wage differences
are reduced, and the incentive compatibility constraint is relaxed because the skilled
worker finds it harder to mimic the unskilled worker. However, simulations of optimal
nonlinear policies revealed that the impact of general equilibrium effects on optimal
policies is modest. Only at low levels of the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labor, marginal subsidies (taxes) on skilled (unskilled) education, and
marginal subsidies on skilled work are found to be substantially positive.
In future research, the current analysis can be cast in a model with two production
sectors, each exhibiting different factor intensities, so as to investigate the desirabil-
ity of aggregate production efficiency, and the optimality of zero commodity taxation.
Our conjecture is that deviations from aggregate production efficiency, and nonzero
commodity will be optimal, as Naito (1999, 2004, 2007) and Pirttilä and Tuomala
(2001) have demonstrated in similar settings, but without education policies and hu-
man capital investment. However, it remains unclear how optimal education policies
will be affected. The current two-type analysis of nonlinear income taxation may also
be extended to a setting with a continuum of skill types in order to further investigate
how factor prices should be exploited for redistribution under nonlinear income tax-
ation with more realistic skill distributions, as in, for example, Diamond (1998) and
Saez (2001). Nevertheless, the expressions for the incentive compatibility constraints
reveal that each of them is dependent on the entire wage distribution, and therefore
on all the actions of all other agents. As a consequence, one may need to resort to nu-
merical simulations. Our results under linear income taxation will also change when
more general utility or earnings functions are used to analyze the importance of in-
come effects, and to allow for the possibility that education has a varying degree of
complementarity with work effort (Jacobs and Bovenberg 2011). Also, extensions
with imperfections in labor markets due to for example minimum wages, search fric-
tions, unions, and efficiency wages may be interesting avenues for future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix
Optimal linear policies
The first-order condition for the optimal linear income tax is given by
∂L
∂t
= −
∑
n
ωn
(
wnanφ(en)ln − p(1 − s)en
)
gn
+ η
∑
n
(
wnanφ(en)ln − p(1 − s)en
)
gn
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+ ηt
∑
n
(
wnanφ(en)
∂ln
∂t
)
gn − ηs
∑
n
p
∂en
∂t
gn
+ (ω1(1 − t)H1 + ηtH1
)( ∂w1
∂H1
∂H1
∂t
+ ∂w1
∂H2
∂H2
∂t
)
+ (ω2(1 − t)H2 + ηtH2
)( ∂w2
∂H1
∂H1
∂t
+ ∂w2
∂H2
∂H2
∂t
)
= 0, (36)
where Roy’s lemma has been used, i.e., ∂vn
∂t
= −(wnanφ(en)ln − (1 − s)pen), and
∂vn
∂wn
= (1 − t)anφ(en)ln. The first-order condition for the linear income tax can be
rewritten by substituting wnanφ(en)ln − p(1 − s)en = (1 − β)zn and pen = β1−s zn
(both are derived from the first-order condition for learning):
∂L
∂t
= −
∑
n
ωn(1 − β)zngn + η
∑
n
(1 − β)zngn
+ η t
1 − t
∑
n
(
zn
∂ln
∂t
1 − t
ln
)
gn − η s
(1 − t)(1 − s)
∑
n
znβ
∂en
∂t
1 − t
en
gn
+
(
ω1 + η t1 − t
)
H1
(
H1F11
∂H1
∂t
1 − t
H1
+ H2F12 ∂H2
∂t
1 − t
H2
)
+
(
ω2 + η t1 − t
)
H2
(
H1F12
∂H1
∂t
1 − t
H1
+ H2F22 ∂H2
∂t
1 − t
H2
)
= 0. (37)
Next, use the distributional characteristic (17), divide by average income z¯ = F(·)
and η. Use the property that the labor demand functions are homogenous of degree
zero:
H1
∂w1
∂H1
= H1F11(H1,H2) = −H2F12(H1,H2) = −H2 ∂w2
∂H1
, (38)
H2
∂w2
∂H2
= H2F22(H1,H2) = −L1F12(H1,H2) = −H1 ∂w1
∂H2
. (39)
Substitution of (38) and (39) gives (note that symmetry of the substitution matrix
implies ∂w1
∂H2
= ∂w2
∂H1
= F12)
(1 − β)ξ − t
1 − t ε¯
lt + s
(1 − t)(1 − s)βε¯
et
−
(
ω2
η
− ω1
η
)(
εHt1 − εHt2
)H1F1
F
H2F2
F
F12F
F1F2
= 0, (40)
where the income weighted elasticities are defined as ε¯lt ≡ ∑n εltn zngn/
∑
n zngn =
(1 − α)εlt1 + αεlt2 , and ε¯et ≡
∑
n ε
et
n zngn/
∑
n zngn = (1 − α)εet1 + αεet2 . Further,
εHtn ≡ − ∂Hn∂t 1−tHn = εztn = εltn + βεetn = εnμn . Use 1 − α ≡ H1F1F , α ≡ H2F2F , 1σ ≡ F12FF1F2 ,
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and simplify to obtain
ξ(1−β)− t
1 − t ε¯
lt + s
(1 − t)(1 − s)βε¯
et −
(
ω2
η
− ω1
η
)(
ε1
μ1
− ε2
μ2
)
α(1−α) 1
σ
= 0.
(41)
The first-order condition for the linear education subsidy is
∂L
∂s
=
∑
n
ωn(1 − t)pengn − η
∑
n
(1 − t)pengn
+ ηt
∑
n
(
wnanφ(en)
∂ln
∂s
gn
)
− ηs
∑
n
p
∂en
∂s
gn
+ (ω1(1 − t)H1 + ηtH1
)( ∂w1
∂H1
∂H1
∂s
+ ∂w1
∂H2
∂H2
∂s
)
+ (ω2(1 − t)H2 + ηtH2
)( ∂w2
∂H1
∂H1
∂s
+ ∂w2
∂H2
∂H2
∂s
)
= 0, (42)
where Roy’s lemma has been used, i.e., ∂vn
∂s
= (1 − t)pen, and ∂vn∂wn =
(1 − t)anφ(en)ln. The first-order condition for s can be rewritten by rearranging,
and substituting pen = β1−s zn (derived from the first-order condition for learning):
∂L
∂s
=
∑
n
ωn
(
1 − t
1 − s
)
βzngn − η
∑
n
(
1 − t
1 − s
)
βzngn
+ η t
1 − s
∑
n
(
zn
∂ln
∂s
1 − s
ln
gn
)
− η s
1 − s
∑
n
1
1 − s βzn
∂en
∂s
1 − s
en
gn
+
(
ω1
(
1 − t
1 − s
)
+ η t
1 − s
)
H1
(
H1F11
∂H1
∂s
1 − s
H1
+ H2F12 ∂H2
∂s
1 − s
H2
)
+
(
ω2
(
1 − t
1 − s
)
+ η t
1 − s H2
)
H2
(
H1F12
∂H1
∂s
1 − s
H1
+ H2F22 ∂H2
∂s
1 − s
H2
)
= 0. (43)
Next, use the distributional characteristic (18), divide by ηβ( 1−t1−s )z¯, and use
z¯ = F(·). Apply the property that the labor demand functions are homogenous of
degree zero. Substitution of (38) and (39) gives (note that symmetry of the substitu-
tion matrix implies ∂w1
∂H2
= ∂w2
∂H1
= F12)
−ξ + t
1 − t
ε¯ls
β
− s
(1 − s)(1 − t) ε¯
es +
(
ω2
η
− ω1
η
)(
εHs1 − εHs2
β
)
H1F1
F
H2F2
F
F12F
F1F2
,
(44)
where the income weighted elasticities are defined as ε¯ls ≡ ∑n εlsn zngn/
∑
n zngn =
(1 − α)εls1 + αεls2 , and ε¯es ≡
∑
n ε
es
n zngn/
∑
n zngn = (1 − α)εes1 + αεes2 . Also the
elasticity of skilled and unskilled labor is defined as: εHsn ≡ ∂Hn∂s (1−s)Hn = εzsn = εlsn +
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βεesn = β(1+εn)μn . Next, use 1−α ≡ H1F1F , α ≡ H2F2F , 1σ ≡ F12FF1F2 , and simplify to obtain
ξ − t
1 − t
ε¯ls
β
+ s
(1 − s)(1 − t) ε¯
es −
(
ω2
η
− ω1
η
)(
1 + ε1
μ1
− 1 + ε2
μ2
)
α(1 − α) 1
σ
.
(45)
Subtracting the first-order conditions for t and s yields
t
1 − t
(
ε¯lt
1 − β −
ε¯ls
β
)
= s
(1 − s)(1 − t)
(
βε¯et
1 − β − ε¯
es
)
− α(1 − α)
σ
(
ω2
η
− ω1
η
)
×
(
εHt1 − εHt2
1 − β −
εHs1 − εHs2
β
)
= 0. (46)
Substituting the relevant elasticities εltn = εn(1−β)μn , εetn = εnμn , εlsn =
βεn
μn
, εesn =
1
μn
yields ε¯lt1−β − ε¯
ls
β
= 0, βε¯et1−β − ε¯es = −11−β ,
εHt1 −εHt2
1−β −
εHs1 −εHs2
β
= 0. Therefore,
s
(1−s)(1−t) = 0. The optimal income tax follows from substituting s = 0 and εHt1 −
εHt2 = ε1μ1 − ε2μ2 in the expression for the optimal income tax.
Optimal nonlinear policies
The optimal marginal tax rate on the high-ability type follows from multiplying the
first-order condition for c1 (24) by ∂u1/∂l1∂u1/∂c1 , and substituting the result into (25). Re-
arranging while using the definition for T ′1 ≡ 1 + 1w1a1φ(e1)
∂u1/∂l1
∂u1/∂c1
yields
T ′1 =
θ
η
l2
w1a1φ(e1)
a2
a1
∂u∗1
∂l2
∂π−1
∂l1
= θ
η
l2
w1
a2
a1
∂u∗1
∂l2
∂π−1
∂H1
. (47)
Next, derive that ∂π−1
∂H1
= 1
σ
α
(1−α)
1
H2
from differentiating the skill premium:
∂(π−1)
∂H1
= ∂(F2/F1)
∂H1
= F21F1 − F11F2
F 21
= 1
H2
1
σ
α
(1 − α), (48)
where the property is used that the labor demand function is homogeneous of degree
zero (38). Substitution of the last result yields the equation in the text.
Repeating the same procedure with the first-order conditions for c2 (27) and for l2
(28) yields the marginal tax on unskilled labor income T ′2 ≡ 1 + 1w2a2φ(e2)
∂u2/∂l2
∂u2/∂c2
,
T ′2 =
(
1 − T ′2
)θ
η
∂u∗1
∂c2
+ 1
w2a2φ(e2)
θ
η
∂u∗1
∂l2
a2
a1
(
π−1(·) + l2 ∂π
−1(·)
∂l2
)
. (49)
π−1 + l2 ∂π−1∂l2 can be written as π−1 +H2 ∂π
−1
∂H2
= π−1 − 1
σ
α
1−α
H1
H2
where (39) is used:
∂(π−1)
∂H2
= ∂(F2/F1)
∂H2
= F22F1 − F12F2
F 21
= − 1
H2
H1
H2
1
σ
α
(1 − α) . (50)
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Substitute this result and ∂u
∗
1
∂l2
= T ′1θ
η
1
σ
α
(1−α)
1
w1a1φ(e2)
to get
T ′2 =
(
1 − T ′2
)θ
η
∂u∗1
∂c2
+ T ′1
(
1 − α
α
)
(σ − 1). (51)
Rearranging yields the expression in the text.
Optimal education subsidies for the skilled worker follow from combining the
expression of the optimal income tax (30) with the first-order condition for e1 (26).
First, rewrite the first-order condition for e1 using the definition of the subsidy on
human capital investment S′1 ≡ 1 − w1a1φ′(e1)l1,
−S′1 =
θ
η
∂u∗1
∂l2
l2
a2
a1
∂π−1
∂e1
. (52)
Dividing this by the expression for the optimal income tax gives the expression in the
text.
Similarly, we find the optimal subsidy on education for the unskilled worker.
Rewrite the first-order condition for e2 using S′2 ≡ 1 − w2a2φ′(e2)l2
−S′2 =
θ
η
∂u∗1
∂l2
l2
a2
a1
∂π−1
∂e2
. (53)
Using the properties of the production function and substituting 1 − S′2 =
w2a2φ′(e2)l2, we obtain
S′2 =
θ
η
∂u∗1
∂l2
l2
a2
a1
1
w2H2
H1
H2
1
σ
α
(1 − α)
(
1 − S′2
)
. (54)
Dividing the last equation by (1 − S′2) and substituting T ′1w1a1φ(e2) = θη 1σ α(1−α)
∂u∗1
∂l2
gives the equation in the text.
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